A Disagreement On Contemplation

1177b -- "And contemplation seems to be the only activity loved for its own sake, for nothing comes from it beyond the contemplating, while from things involving action we gain something for ourselves, to a greater or lesser extent, beyond the action."

I disagree with Aristotle here. When looking at contemplation in class, we discussed how contemplation was a constant, deep thinking of the divine and things that cannot be controlled by our own will. These are things that are not in our control, yet can be thought about. They are intangible with our hands, but not with our brains. And with this, I agree. But, I do not agree with the above excerpt because I believe that there is something to gain from contemplation. The act of contemplation is not an act that one would perform in hopes to gain something, but something is most definitely gained. If one is contemplating the divine, the mystic, or the unknown, there is no way of knowing the absolute truth. But, the more one thinks about and contemplates such things, a personal opinion/conclusion can be drawn from one's discoveries through contemplation. Things can be learned about one's own self by looking at the divine, and questions can sometimes be answered personally. Therefore, what is to be gained from contemplation is a more mature understanding of what others have not thought about. If one man does not contemplate, the man who does contemplate has matured further than the other and is more at work than the other. Contemplation can lead to the truth revealed in part or full, depending on the beliefs of the individual. A religious person who believes in God can contemplate things he does not know and through God can be revealed truths that he can handle in his own capacity. Someone who does not contemplate may have a smaller capacity for an understanding of the truth than someone who contemplates. A non religious person can make sense of somethings through logic or feelings or other realizations that come about through contemplation. If contemplating the universe (stars, etc.), one can come to a conclusion that a higher power, a designer, must have created such a thing as the universe, or come to the conclusion that science has made sense of it, or that their incapability to understand its complexity is as far as it goes. But, someone who does not contemplate will never have an understanding of any of this and will have never given any of it any thought at all. Therefore, one who contemplates has gained much more in the pursuit of virtue and in their own understanding of life than the one who does not contemplate. Moreover, contemplating the divine and the unknowable can affect one's way of life and daily choices. If one holds the belief that God exists, he will act on it in such a way that it will appeal to God. If one does not believe in an after life, one will determine life's choices through a lens that does not concern anything but the here and now and what is virtuous or not. And one can also begin to know the unknowable through faith. This is not the same way of knowing something definitely, but actually knowing something through confidence and conviction after contemplation.

There is much to gain from contemplation. But I would revise my previous statement that I disagree with Aristotle and say that I disagree in part. I agree that contemplation is loved for its own sake by the individual, because when contemplating, it does not seem that one's intentions would be to gain something but because one is seeking answers, as most are. But, I do believe there is much to gain from contemplating, which is where I disagree with Aristotle.

Friendship and Love

From the onset of Book IX, Aristotle is saying that friendship and love are synonymous. When we discussed this in class, I found myself in disagreement. Love seems to be such a personal emotion, reserved only for special people that you have grown together with for an extended period of a time, a person that you can share deep, dark secrets with without fear of them judging you. Some inadvertent responsibility comes with the condition of being loved. When you tell someone that, you are now saddling them with the duties that you would never think to put onto someone you DON'T love.

Now, having said all that, I find it very hard to feel this way towards every person that I call a friend. Forget Facebook's definition of a friend, but even my own is different. I meet someone and within minutes we can become friends. Our relationship continues to blossom and grow as we get to know each other, but love is a long way down the road. Yet we have been friends for a long time. Perhaps Aristotle's definition of friendship was more personal than my own. It says, "any association of people who spend time and do things together, share in pains and pleasures, and wish for each other's good." I can see the discrepancy. There are many people with whom I share pleasures -- we have a common interest and we celebrate it together. But we are nowhere near close enough to share in the pains, that is more personal.

Even then I have a hard time saying that I love every person I am friends with. And by the same token, I don't want to deny the title of "friend" to all the people I care about but do not love. In this instance, I feel that the term love is being used out of place.

Book 9: Friends and Fortune

In Book 9, Chapter 11, Aristotle makes the claim that we need different sorts of friends in different circumstances. When one has stumbled upon misfortune, one needs useful friends who help them to escape from their current situation. Upon experiencing good fortune, one needs good men to be their friends because it is more beneficial. I can’t help but consider how my friendships have been dictated in the past according to my own circumstances. Sometimes it can be difficult for us to know whether we are experiencing good or bad fortune because the transition between the two are so gradual. During a gradual shift between good and bad fortune, is it possible to see a friendship gradually failing? If we experience good fortune for an extended period but drastically and suddenly fall into misfortune, our “good” friends that complimented us so well in good fortune may not be useful to us anymore, no matter how close we were. It is easier to visualize one shedding friends who were present during misfortune, because these friends are not required to be good. Is there a sudden moment, a point of realization that alerts us to our friends shortcomings? It seems to me that we try to cling to those old friendships, no matter how useless they are to us know, because they still offer an illusion of security

Thoughts on Friendship 2

As we have learned from Book XIII, there are three types of friendship: friendship based on utility, friendship based on pleasure, and friendship based on the goodness of character.

Originally, when Aristotle made the argument that one must love the self more than one's friend, I had an uneasy feeling inside. If one had friend, who was not virtuous, and who had friendships based on pleasure, self-love would be bad indeed. However, in a friendship based on the goodness of character and an active action for the sake of the good, self-love does not turn out to be so bad.

Mr. Miller made an interesting observation in his blog, and was also something I was going to talk about in mine. Are friendships healthy when two people are at different levels of virtue? (i.e. one person is at the level of virtue, while someone else is at the level of self-restraint). I believe these relationship are not necessary, but definitely help one who is not as mature and virtuous become better faster. A lot of times, when one sees and example laid before them, it gives the lesser person the desire to be better and persevere when obstacles come in the way.

As far as the best friendships go however, I believe the two people must be on the same level of virtue. If the two are on different levels, one will not grow and continue to be pressed to be better, and the other will be dragged from behind. In a perfectly healthy friendship, the two people of equal virtue will be able to encourage one another and thus strengthen each others relationship for the sake of the beautiful.

Friendship and Absence

"Distance does not dissolve the friendship without qualification, but only its activity. But if the absence is long, it also seems to cause the friendship to be forgotten." - Book VIII, Chapter IV

After reading this quote I began to think about how true and unfortunate this statement really is. I'm sure almost everyone can think back to their childhood or even high school friends and realize just how distant many of those relationships have grown. However, with the connections our generation has grown accustomed to, could it be possible that we have the ability to nurture our long-distant friendships more successfully than those of the past? As long as the individual is willing to put forth the effort, cell phones and facebook seem to make that task relatively simple. Now I do not mean to say that either of these alternative means of communication could ever replace the value of real quality time, but they can work as a useful tool in keeping the relationship active. Is this a good change? Maybe the purpose of separation is to keep our friendships limited to a small, more intimate number as oppose to everyone desperately trying to grasp a hold of their past. Regardless, separation seems to be an inevitable part of life and I think the relationships that pass us by are falling more into our own hands and less in the hands of time and distance.

Thoughts on friendship

I think that it is interesting the things that aristotle says about friendship in Book 8, Chapter 3.

He starts by describing the different types of friendships. He speaks of mutually beneficial friendships or friendships where people are only friends because they believe that they can gain something from the friendship. I personally believe that this is not friendship at all.

But then he speaks of the best type of friendship, a type where two people of similar or the same level of virtue come together and are good for the sake of themselves but are naturally beneficial toward others. This is the part of the argument that i would like to delve into. Is aristotle assuming that the only people who are capable of this perfect friendship or even on some level successful friendship people who are on the same level of virtue? Can this argument be reversed and say that the perfect friendships that people have indicate that they are of the same level of virtue?

I happen to disagree with both of these questions in the fact that i believe from both personal experience and first person accounts of other's relationship that good, successful friendships can occur in people who are very different in the level of virtue. I think that this does affect the compatibility of set of people but i think that it can be overcome.

Aristotle's Ethics.

What is the good life? Some say this, some say that, some say something completely different. The point is, they're all a bit right and they're all a bit wrong. It's hard to be more precise than this because ethics isn't precise and wise people know this, so never, ever, ask me to be less vague or ambiguous.

A good life is lived accordingly to one's nature. Vegetables grow, so a good vegetable life is one in which it moves in an anomaly way. Fox News lobotomises, so a good Fox News program is one which lobotomises in a foxy way. Humans think, so a good human life is one in which it thinks in a humanly way. We also kill, act with prejudice, lust, look after number one and so on, but that doesn't define our nature, because I don't want it too.

What is virtue? It is finding the mean. For example, generosity isn't the opposite of greed, it's the in between virtue between the opposite vices of greed and profligacy. Courage is the mean between rashness and cowardliness. Writing well is the mean between writing badly and writing in a way that is so good, it's bad. Having good judgement is the mean between being a bad judge and what might be called over judging, if you were foolish enough to take this mean idea to its logical conclusion. You may think this golden mean doesn't work all the time, but it's not precise and only stupid people expect too much precision.

Who is more praise worthy?

Who is more praiseworthy? The man who stubs his toe and uses all of the will power he has to refrain from cursing, or the man who stubs his toe and doesn't even consider cursing?

When I think of being worthy of praise, I think about somebody who does something; not somebody who does nothing. In this case, I am tempted to say that the man who has to refrain from cursing and succeeds is more worthy of praise.

I say this because after stubbing his toe, he instinctively wants to curse. However, he makes the decision that it is not appropriate and then uses his will power to hold himself back. This man has just done something; refrained from cursing.

The virtuous man stubs his toe and then thinks about the pain. The thought of cursing never enters his mind. Both men have to deal with the pain, but the virtuous man never has to deal with forcing himself to not curse. It seems to me that since the virtuous man did less, he is less worthy of praise.

Now, if we were asking ourselves who is more worthy of praise as an individual, I would say the virtuous man. I think this is pretty obvious. However, that wasn't the question.

I'm sure this is going to cause some people to want to prove me wrong. So go ahead, I would like to be enlightened.

Pleasure

Pleasure is a tricky, subjective subject. It's motivating power is undeniable, and humanity naturally gravitates towards that which is pleasurable. It's benefit, however, is hotly debated. We find that for some, it drives their compassion and motivates them to do virtuous things, for they take pleasure in such things. For others, it drives them to do wrong, because they have become habituated to do such a thing. However, unlike other philosophers, Aristotle claims that pleasure itself is not inherently bad. .

Pleasure's goodness is subjective, of course. Taking pleasure not just in the correct things, but also the correct amount, is crucial. Excessive pleasure can lead to ruin, as we conjectured while reading The Republic. For example, taking pleasure in bettering oneself in sport is good, yet going to far will lead to injury and the lessening of your skill. Once again, we return to the central concept of the theme found in this book, and the mean in relation to pleasure (as well as the object or act which is giving the pleasure) is certainly a cornerstone in our search for virtue.

Finally, the medium of pleasure must be taken into consideration. Bodily and mental pleasure certainly need to be distinguished. Bodily pleasure is superficial; it is not necessarily bad, so long as it is not distracting, but it is not productive in terms of individual growth; intellectual pleasures, such as the pleasure of reading, however, must be considered in the highest form of pleasure, because it further allows one to judge what is virtuous and just.

Self-restraint

"Is a self-restrained person someone who stands firm in any and every sort of rational understanding and choice, or in one that is right, and is an unrestrained person anyone who fails to stand firm in any and every sort of choice and rational understanding, or in an understanding that is not false and a choice that is right?"(Book VII, Chapter 9)

Aristotle is trying to describe what it means to be restrained. I believe that a self-restrained person is someone who will stand firm in their decision. A person cannot control themselves if they are willing to give up at any situation. A person must be very strong to be completely self-restrained. I believe that there are very few people who are actually self-restrained. It is in human nature to simply give up if something is hard or unfair, but some people will persevere and will stand up to anything they face. They will not take no for an answer and will always stand up for what they believe in and will not fail. However, Aristotle says that people that stand firm in a decision can be called stubborn. This could be detrimental to the person because other humans will not like being around them. I believe that to have the best life, you must be somewhere in the middle of self-restrained and unrestrained.

Book 7: Who is more praiseworthy?

After reading Book 7 I couldn’t help but wonder whether it was more worthy of praise to possess great virtue or to possess great self-restraint. It seems initially that the most natural answer would be virtue, but I want to know exactly why before I jump to this conclusion. I’m aware that the relevance of this question is debatable and is not very significant in our overall discussion of ethics since it has been firmly established that virtue is superior to self-restraint, however I’m still curious.
If two men are running a marathon and one is a gifted athlete while the other has a prosthetic leg, and the gifted runner finishes much sooner than the handicapped runner, why is that we would perhaps give the handicapped runner more praise or at least as much praise as the gifted runner for completing the marathon? The gifted runner is obviously more virtuous in the physical category of running since he is naturally inclined to excel, while the handicapped runner has a huge obstacle to overcome just to achieve such a feat. We give them both praise, but it is two different kinds of praise. The gifted runner is praised for being virtuous and talented, while the handicapped runner is praised for possessing a grand determination and self-discipline. Also, completing the marathon is a much different accomplishment for each of the runners. I believe this can be paralleled to a contrast between someone who was given the proper upbringing and naturally develops virtuous qualities while young versus someone who experienced a poor upbringing and naturally developed vices while young. The “finish line” in this circumstance would be that both subjects attain an impressive level of goodness, one through virtue and the other through self-restraint. It seems that the naturally virtuous character has an easier time of things because he only has to follow his natural tendencies which guide towards whatever he takes pleasure in, which is goodness. The character with vices has to develop restraint through reasoning and genuine realization that good will serve him better. Also, he does not necessarily take pleasure in his restrained actions. The vice-stricken subject is certainly handicapped in this sort of race.
I must conclude that both subjects are worthy of accolades and one cannot hoist one above the other. This is due to the fact that I tend to discredit people who are naturally virtuous because it seems like they don’t have to put forth any effort for their virtue. However, if I observe the case of the stereotypical “preacher’s kid”, which I would define as someone who is brought up in a good home with virtuous role models as parents, these kids who on paper should grow up to be virtuous people are very often stricken with vices. I know several literal “preacher’s kids” and some of them are virtuous and some of them are incredible opposites of their parents. It is because of this example that I must give naturally virtuous people praise for retaining their virtues, because this is indeed a challenge, especially with all of the temptations our society has to offer.

Attack of the Bad

In Book VII of Ethics, Aristotle refers to the proverb, “when water chokes someone, what should he drink?” (114a, line 36). So of course I thought about what I do because this has happened several times, and I always just drink more water. But how does this connect to the unrestrained person that the proverb is being related to?
In this section Aristotle says that people who act from conviction and choice are better off than those who act through unrestraint. He backs this up by saying, “since he [the person who acts from conviction and choice] could be more easily cured by being persuaded otherwise, while the unrestrained person is subject to the proverb” (lines 34-35). What I take from this is that the unrestrained person either cannot be changed by persuasion or that it would take a lot of it to do the trick.
The unrestrained person “chokes” when they do something bad or have a vice, which is the water. Then someone tries to persuade them that what they are doing is bad, so they do something else instead that is also bad. I got this from section 114b, line1 which says, “as it is, even when he is persuaded, he nevertheless does something else.”
So what should the man choking drink? From this section of Ethics it sounds like no matter what the unrestrained person drinks, it will continue to choke him because he chooses the bad.

-Rachel Tidwell

Self-Restraint and Virtue

At the beginning of class, we started talking about the differences in between self-restraint and virtue. My first inclination was that self-restraint was a virtue. But after much deliberation, it was apparent that virtue is doing something while self-restraint is not doing something. Likewise, my high school football coach always had a saying that I still remember to this day. "We don't play not to lose, we play to win." Though both would lead to a victory, one is not doing something and the other is actively striving toward a goal. Likewise, virtue is above self-restraint.

I also thought it was interesting that no one is born virtuous. We all go through different processes in achieving virtue in certain aspects of our lives. For instance, in one area, one might start at un-restraint (or even vice) and have to work their way up to restraint and then to virtue. Also, I never realized how difficult it is to be virtuous or just. In chapter 9 of book 5 Aristotle says,

(1137a) "[People] believe that it is easy to be just, but it is not...to do these things while being in a certain condition is neither easy nor up to them."

I personally believe that it is impossible for one to achieve total virtue in one's life. Theoretically, I could see how it can be possible, but I take the stance that man is born inherently bad. Therefore, I believe there will always be areas in one's life when one can only go as far as self-restraint, because one will always have the desires of the flesh to do things that are not for the Good. In other words, I do not think that anyone can be virtuous in every single area.

Thoughts On Currency

In chapter five when Aristotle used currency to discuss reciprocity in the larger conversation of what justice was, it struck as very ironic, that he would use currency, a thing which has caused so much injustice in the world, to show how justice operates. Interestingly enough his descripition of currency made very good sense, and seemed in all regards to be just. So how is it that an idea such as currency, which should facilitate justice, often does just the opposite.

Of course the obvious answer is that even though the idea of currency is a great idea and works theoretically we humans, who have proven ourselves to be something other than just, screw it up more than we get it right. The idea of currency is lacking an important component that humans are supposed to supply, but most often fail to: decency. So my question is this, can anything be done to implement decency into the model for currency that we currently use? If indeed currency is just an institution we have created to facilitate justice, could we make it better?

I wonder if governing systems such as communism try to address this issue, but I think history has proven that communism doesn't work. And rather than amending our current model for currency communism gets rid of it. So a new political system is probably not the answer.

Anything else that I come back to revolves around people having virtue when using currency. But maybe there is some way to handle currency that would make it more decent. Any thoughts?

decency, a lack of justice?

As per our in-class discussion, decency as I am told to understand it is a step above justice. It encompasses the knowledge of true equal justice and chooses to ignore it, so to speak, for some greater good, presumably some person(s) benefit(s). I get it, and I see how it appears this way, but I still have trouble wrapping my head around the idea that decency is above justice, and therefore something more than but still part of justice in the equal sense, while it does not permit any sort of injustice. Simply put, does it not seem that if one chooses to ignore the equal justice for the sake of another, then one is doing himself an injustice? For example, take 1, 2, and 3. 1 is the excess of justice (some benefit in this case), 3 is the lack of justice (some amount of injustice), and 2 is the mean (equal justice for both parties). If person A and person B receive equal justice, they are both 2. But if person A decides to be decent and regard himself as a 3 so that B may receive 3, is not A receiving some sort of injustice, even if self-inflicted?

1137b "For the decent thing, though it is better than a certain kind of just thing, is just, and is not better than what is just by being of some other kind. Therefore the same thing is just and decent, and while both are things of serious worth, what is decent is superior."

This quote summarizes Aristotle's view of decency, as well as what I stated at the beginning of my argument. If we read on though, Aristotle admits the impasse.

1137b "...what is decent is just, [but] it is not so according to the law, but is a setting straight of what is legally just. The reason is that every law is universal, and there are some things about which it is not possible to speak rightly when speaking universally."

Aristotle continues to argue that one must approach every determination of justice on a case by case basis, with which I agree. And I agree that the universal laws of justice, those set about for laws, are imperfect in that one cannot apply them in the same way to every case. In this way, decency is required and seemingly some sort of lens through which one must look upon the universal laws. Regardless, I still believe that person A is being done some injustice, however small. Maybe money is a bad example, but I think about when I was driving and was rear-ended by an elderly woman (she could barely see over the steering wheel). I got out, and there was little to no damage. Considering her condition and the detriment (to her) that reporting this accident might have caused her, I shrugged it off, told her it was fine, and went on my way. I believe in this situation I did the decent thing. However, my car's rear bumper was scratched and slightly dinged and I felt as though I had been dealt some injustice, even though I think I did the right thing. (Although, the thought of who she might hit next and how far worse her next accident could be has not since then escaped my mind).

Am I making sense?

Courage and Virtue

I found Aristotle’s discussion of courage and virtue to be very fascinating. At the beginning of Chapter 7 he says, “but the courageous person is as undaunted as a human being can be, and while such a person will be frightened even of such things as vary in magnitude, he will endure them in the way one ought and keeping them in proportion for the sake of the beautiful, since this is the end that belongs to virtue.” (1115b, 11 – pg. 49) This is what he describes as being virtuous, and I take it to mean that a courageous person faces fear even when he/she is frightened and endures them for the sake of the beautiful. That seems to be an appropriate definition, even in today’s world. We consider people courageous who face their fears – if they weren’t afraid in the first place then I do not consider it courageous because they didn’t have to overcome anything.
However, there seems to be a bit of a catch because Aristotle appears to be saying that irrational fears do not count. He says, “so one who endures or fears what one ought, for the reason one ought, as one ought, w hen one ought, and is confident in similar ways, is courageous, since the courageous person undergoes things and acts in accordance with what is worthy and in a way that is proportionate.” (1115b, 20 – pg. 49) I find this interesting because it’s delving deeper into psychological issues. For example, I am deathly afraid of spiders and to me, that is a very serious fear. However when I take a step back and look at it, I can see that most spiders cannot do any harm to me and I am a million times their size. So for me to overcome and face this fear would not be courageous in Aristotle’s opinion. Only the things that one is naturally inclined to be afraid of count towards courage.
Then again, Aristotle says you are insane if you are not afraid of anything. The rash person is a braggart if they do not show enough fear, and one who shows too much fear is a coward. (1115b, 25-30 – pg. 50) I suppose you could say these are the virtues and the vices of the courageous person. All in all, it makes sense, but there would appear to be many contingencies on which acquiring the title of courageous lie. We discussed in class that there is a mean in which a person must fall and that you do not have to be perfect, but I would still argue that according to Aristotle, it is harder than it sounds.
Aristotle concludes the chapter by saying that suicidal person can never be considered courageous. He talks about death being beautiful but it is not to be used an escape. I find this interesting as well. I think there are two groups of people who would argue on either side for suicide. Some would say it is a coward’s way out because that person didn’t have the guts (i.e. courage) to face whatever situation(s) caused him/her to feel suicidal. Others would argue that they were brave enough to take the plunge. It’s a delicate issue but I think Aristotle has said it well.

Civilization?

Near the beginning of the The Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle's treatise on human character, he makes a sharp break from his teacher Plato's view of what constitutes "the good." Plato sees "the good" as being defined in strictly metaphysical terms: it is the ideal that can only be percieved through the use of abstract reasoning. Aristotle doesn't entirely reject this, but he certainly disputes that it is the one and "true" good. In his view, it would be "difficult to say what is meant by the 'absolute' in anything" (I:IV). There is no "good": the "absolute," Platonic good, and the "secondary," practicable good (I:IV).

Aristotle emphasizes practical reasoning over abstraction, and the questions driving the Ethics are eminently practical, namely, what is the "good" life, and how does one live it? He interrogates his subjects in a manner that's somewhat milder than Plato's Socratic dialectic; he isn't looking for a contradiction that undermines the entire premise of what's being put forth, and he isn't attempting to tease out basic assumptions with repeated questions. Instead, he sets forth a proposition or a question, and he then outlines related answers or responses that he identifies as being wrong in some way. Ultimately, he arrives at an appropriate answer to the issue he's posing. The subjects if the first three books of The Nicomachean Ethics-- the nature of the "good" and happiness, the definition of virtue and vice, and the questions of relative virtue and morality--are all examined in this way.

Character is defined by virtue, and virtue enable one to discriminate between the poles of vice and find the golden mean, whether it is finding courage in between foolhardiness or timidity, or temperance in between licentiousness and asceticism. A major aspect of happiness is finding the balance in one's life.

Nicomachean Ethics--Book III, Part Two

"Those who are ignorant also appear to be courageous, and are not far from those who are full of hope, but they are worse to the extent that they have nothing they consider worth facing, while others do. This is why the hopeful hold their ground for a certain time, but those who are decieved run away if they recognize that something is different, or suspect it." 1117a, 24-29

Aristotle beautifully articulates a common occurance among men in these few lines. While most can appear courageous, very few actually are when it comes down to it. There can be no such thing as courage in a man when he finds nothing "worth facing." Because it is only when a man is "facing" that courage is needed. There is no need for courage in a complacent, passionless life.

The fuel of courage is passion. In order to be courageous, there has to be some kind of emotion, rooted and worthy, that activates courage itself. Furthermore, courage is the result of something--it is not in place for the sake of itself. What are those things worthy to be faced with courage? And the test of courage is time. Time does not test courage so much as it sifts of cowardice.

Regardless, the courageous will be known in the end. I have found, like Aristotle, that those who are "decieved" only stick around for a short while. They usually flee before a situation presents itself that demands any sort of courage--they never let it get that far before running away.

States of Mind

During class, we discussed how the use of coffee to be studious is a temporary state of the soul, therefor it did not count as willingly being virtuous. Neither this example nor the example of the "virtuous" drunkard has totally convinced me that one who is aided by an outside source is incapable of being virtuous.

Modern medicine has provided us with a myriad of psychological treatments; many of them now come in the form of a pill, rather than the form of counseling. Counseling could be considered akin to surrounding yourself with a better person and through them aiming more accurately at virtue and in turn happiness, so we have accounted for that. However, psychological drugs pose an interesting problem. Can one truly be considered a virtuous person if they are unable to maintain stability without the consistent use of this medicine? If their condition is truly a chemical imbalance, as many psychological conditions are said to be, then they are certainly caused by an outside source (assuming they did not willingly subject themselves to severe psychological trauma). Therefor, their condition causes them to act unwillingly when they do bad actions on behalf of it. Through the use of these drugs, they combat this condition, rebalance themselves mentally, and are capable of knowing and pursuing the true good. Could we still say that these individuals are not virtuous based upon this dependency?

Friendship

Some of Aristotle's ideas in his Books on Friendship seem so much like common sense that I have to strain to consider whether or not there was ever a time when these ideas about friendship were not common sense, eg: the idea that true friends sincerely wish the best for each other, while lesser friends use others with the improper intent-solely utility or pleasure. And pharses like the following:

"Most people want to be loved rather than to love... But friendship seems to consist more in giving that in recieving affection."

But I like, unlike Plato, who could theoretically be a happy man in the world even on a desert island, Aristotle reminds me that while man might be happy by himself, his happiness is far enriched, made even more complete, with deep friendships.

"... man can be content and self-sufficient alone, but it would surely be paradoxical to represent the man of perfect happiness as solitary; for nobody would choose to have all the good things in the world by himself, because man IS a social creature and naturally constituted to live in company... the happy man needs friendships."

"[Friendship] is... most necessary for living. Nobody would choose to live without friendship even if he had all the good things."

And I like the reminder that friendship is a limited resource, and a rare thing. One can be on good terms with many, but one cannot be very close friends with all, because factors like time and shared activity and the effort of intimacy and common dispositions/levels of character are involved. Goodwill is not friendship, though a part of it.

Responsibility Involving Free Will?

"In that way too it was in the power of an unjust or dissipated person at the beginning not to have come to be that way, which is why they are that way willingly, but once they have become so it is no longer possible not to be so" (1114a 21).

I find this quote very interesting for Aristotle to write. I agree it is the fault of an unjust and dissipated person to become that way. Do I feel like once they have become that way they can't go back? That's something I've always questioned. Once someone is a certain way, I don't believe they can change without the help of God. I also feel these people are more susceptible to fall back into the way they were, which makes me feel like they are still that way at heart. I understand God can change people, and I truly believe He can, but it's easy to be weary of one who has proved themself to be an unjust person.

Aristotle, however, doesn't address free will in book 3. Free will is the power to make a decision without the constraints of external circumstances. Aristotle overlooks this entirely and only focuses on those actions that we are responsible for. He believes that we are not held responsible for actions we do out of ignorance or impulse. Where is the definition that states what we are responsible for? And also, ignorance or not, an action is an action and you're responsible for what you do. I understand the argument of being under the influence, but one chooses to drink. If it was a forced act of someone making one under the influence then I see how it wouldn't be their fault. However, in this case you can also find choice in the groups you hang out with or situations you put yourself in. I will admit that there are situations that are totally out of your control and in that case there would be an unwilling action.

I feel Aristotle leaves an empty case here for fear of defining what responsibility itself is. This leaves us confused to what we are held resonsible for in relation to our actions we are fully aware of and those we are ignorant of or have acted out of impulse on. Not sure i agree with this vague claim, nor do I feel free will can be completely left out of these arguments.

Screw Your Courage to the Sticking Place

Why be courageous? Because, as Aristotle repeatedly points out, "it is a beautiful thing and not to do so would be a shameful thing" (1117a 17-18). Our ideas of courage, however, can often be clouded and mistaken. Whether it be taking the one who is shameless to be courageous because he seems to fear nothing, thinking the man a coward who fears "insolence from his children and wife" (1115a 22), mistaking someone who is moved by spiritedness/passion without the complete intention of courage, or believing the professional soldier to be courageous simply because he has experienced war before, we often misjudge another's intention and true disposition.

One point Aristotle makes a strong case as to the reliablity of "professional" or hired military. While the professional soldiers do have the equipment and the experience of war, they often lose their nerve and courage when the danger and threat pushes them too far and are often the first to cut ties and save themselves. The citizens, however, fight until they can no more because, to them, it is a shameful and painful thing to run. While this leans further away from courage and into spiritedness, spiritedness (passion and bravery) and courage are close.

On a side note, however, I would like to address the inquiry about coffee allowing one to be studious and, in turn, virtuous. In many ways this is exactly like the example of someone who is drunk doing nice things like helping out at an orphanage. The use of a substance to alter, especially knowingly, one's state is not virtuous because it alters what one truly is. The state is not entirely stable and it detracts from issues at hand.

Book 3: Part 1

Book 3: Part 1

Much of Book 3 concerns with how we can measure and define virtue. Aristotle states that virtue is concerned with feelings and actions, and we must distinguish between what is a willing act and an unwilling act in order to define these acts as virtuous. Obviously, a shameful willing act is not virtuous, but at the beginning of Book 3, Aristotle states that for “unwilling actions there is forgiveness and sometimes even pity”. Unwilling acts are those that happen through ignorance or from the result of some external force. However, if we are responsible for our own ignorance than the act is deemed willful. Aristotle also states that bad people are merely ignorant people who wish and choose for what is apparently good but is actually bad. However, in Book II Aristotle says that moral virtue is acquired through habit and constant practice. If there is no one to instruct someone to what good moral virtue is, than it is impossible for these people to develop virtuous habits because they do not know how to practice them. I might disagree with Aristotle’s definition of ignorant people as being “bad” people because it’s not necessarily they’re fault that they’re bad; if in their mind they’re doing what is good, how can we speak of them as being bad? Without an established code of morals within a society, “good” and “bad” people is incredibly open for interpretation. An example in our present society is abortion. Some view people who get abortions as bad people, and others don’t find it significant.