The Methods of Personal Justice

Socrates has presented to us a very elaborate construction in the form of the city which provides us with a detailed, yet understandable, model of the human soul. While one could point out flaws with minute details of the argument, I believe that it is hard pressed to find a fault great enough to undermine it's entirety, so this post assumes that one agrees with the equivalence of the city and the soul, at least in relation to justice and virtue.

In many ways, the definition of justice we are presented towards the end of book four is a method for determining whether or not an action is just. It can nearly be compared to a computer program. With a certain input, say, an example of an action, it is considered within the 3 part soul. It is first considered by desire; if it is an action which fulfills a desire, then we must also consider it by spirit. If the spirited part of the soul seems to be stirred by this action, in one way or another, then it must too be considered by the ruling class of the soul. If this also deems the action necessary, then it is indeed just, assuming the soul is properly conditioned in the way Socrates has set forth. However, it is not that simple, by any means. This is merely one possible way for the soul to deem an action as just, for it is not necessary for all parts of the soul to completely agree upon a decision. If an action is viewed as negative by the desiring part of the soul, it may still be overwritten by the other two parts of the soul; for example, by nature, a violent conflict is not desirable, because it could lead to the harm of the body, and to desire pain would be illogical. However, the spirit might yearn for this, and the calculating area of the soul states that either the conflict is reasonable or not. If it is not, then it is not just, but if it is, the action is deemed just, despite the stance of the desiring part. For an action to be just, it is not necessary for all parts of the soul to be in agreement. In fact, so long as the decisive part deems it for the better of the whole of the soul, then the action might be considered just much the same way as the rulers of the city deem an action to be just or not.

Does this go against the harmonious relationship between these three parts of the soul? I do not see it this way, but I also hesitate to take this analogy too far. In my opinion, to say that these three divisions of the soul are harmonious implies that they are all equal in the process of determining whether or not an action is justified, when the deliberating area of the soul is clearly the most important of the three areas in this regard. While this certainly does not imply that the other parts are not necessary, the idea that they are all equally necessary does not sit well with me.